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Newsroom
Calabresi on Federalism in Harvard LR
Steven G. Calabresi, Weisberger Visiting Professor of Law, argues that democracy can work in the United States
only in the presence of "judicially enforced federalism."

From HARVARD LAW REVIEW: "The Constitution and Disdain" by Steven G. Calabresi

Responding to Pamela S. Karlan, Democracy and Disdain, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (2012)

It is a puzzle that Professor Pamela Karlan could fault the
Roberts Court for its disdain for Congress in a case where the Court upheld an act of Congress that a
popular majority hates. Nevertheless, Professor Karlan’s Foreword to the Harvard Law Review’s Supreme
Court 2011 Term issue is full of disdain itself — disdain for the Constitution and disdain for federalism as
well.1 Karlan seems to think the Supreme Court ought never to strike down as unconstitutional any acts of
Congress except for federal laws that close down the political process or that violate minority rights. She
claims that the Congress that passed the Obama health care law in 2010 spoke for the American people
but that the twenty-six states that challenged the health care law did not.2 Karlan does not mention the
fact that the House of Representatives voted twice to repeal the health care law, first in 2011 and again in
2012,3 nor does she mention the fact that a majority of Americans opposed the law when it was first
passed4 and that a majority of Americans continue to favor repeal of the health care law today.5 This
essay will explain why Karlan is wrong about the Constitution, wrong about the countermajoritarian
difficulty, and wrong about the implications for federalism umpiring of John Hart Ely’s theory of judicial
review.6

First, Karlan simply does not understand the countermajoritarian difficulty. Individual rights cases like
Lochner v. New York7 or Roe v. Wade8 raise a countermajoritarian difficulty, as Professor Alexander
Bickel argued, because they forbid government at both the federal and state levels from doing
something.9 This difficulty is inherent in almost all individual rights cases, including cases where the
individual right is actually present in the text of the Constitution, as with the freedom of speech.

In federalism cases, however, the Supreme Court chooses which majority should govern with respect to
an issue as between national majorities and state majorities. Judicial umpiring of federalism cases is thus
not countermajoritarian. Suppose the Supreme Court had ruled that the federal health care law in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius10 was unconstitutional on enumerated powers ground.
Such a ruling would not have meant that similar state health care laws, like the one in Massachusetts,
were unconstitutional. It would only have meant that Congress had exceeded the bounds of its limited and
enumerated powers. When the Supreme Court polices federalism boundary lines, it is playing umpire
between the national government and the states. The Court is choosing whether majorities at the national
level or majorities in each of the fifty states have power to govern regarding a disputed issue. Playing
umpire between the national government and the states is simply not countermajoritarian in any way, nor
is it undemocratic. Instead, the Supreme Court is simply deciding which democratic majority — federal or
state — our Constitution and history empowers to rule. Imagine that decisions have to be made about: (1)
zoning in Palo Alto, California; (2) raising pay for California state employees; and (3) entering into an
immigration control agreement with Mexico. Our Constitution and history make it clear that these
decisions should be made by: (1) the City of Palo Alto; (2) the state of California; and (3) the federal
government. Now imagine that Congress tried to legislate with respect to zoning in Palo Alto and with
respect to pay raises for California state employees while California tried to negotiate a new immigration
control agreement with Mexico. Democratic rule would obviously be enhanced in this hypothetical if the
courts treated as legally binding only the majority decision which was made by the legally competent
jurisdictional unit.11

One cannot have a democracy until one has a “demos,” that is, a recognized group of people who have
jurisdiction over a certain issue. Letting California negotiate an immigration control agreement with Mexico
or letting the federal government legislate with respect to zoning in Palo Alto is undemocratic because our
Constitution and history assign those powers to other entities. When the wrong democratic jurisdiction
rules regarding an issue, the result is either imperial colonialism or minority rule.12 We would think that a
Congress that adopted a special zoning law for Palo Alto was imperialistic, was overcentralized, and was
treating Palo Alto as a kind of colony. We would also think, however, that a state that negotiated an
immigration control agreement with a foreign power was a minority that was intruding into a sphere that
our Constitution reserves to the federal government. It would be undemocratic for Congress to legislate

regarding zoning in Palo Alto or for California to legislate regarding agreements with Mexico even if either
decision were made by a vote of the majority of the people. “Majority rule or democracy presupposes that
one knows and respects the relevant jurisdictional lines. Accordingly, judicial enforcement of the
jurisdictional lines of democratic government is potentially democracy enhancing.”13

The United States is the third most populous country in the world (after China and India), and it is the
fourth largest country in the world territorially (after Russia, Canada, and China). Democracy can work on
so large a scale only if there is a firm sense of jurisdictional boundary lines that keeps the national
government from being an imperial tyrant and that keeps the states from taking actions unilaterally that all
the other states have to in some way pay for. Judicially enforced federalism is thus critical for the U.S.
Constitution to continue to work.

The need for an umpire to police federalism boundary lines actually explains the emergence of judicial
review in the first place in the United States, in Canada, in Australia, in India, in Germany, and most
recently in the European Union.14 Federations need to have an umpire who can mediate between the
nation and its provinces or states. Judicial review usually starts out by providing such a federal judicial
umpire, and it then expands to offer federal judicial policing of individual human rights violations.15 Karlan
is thus not only wrong to oppose Supreme Court policing of federalism boundary lines. She is actually
attacking the paradigmatic cases that themselves gave rise to judicial review in the first place!16

The Supreme Court also plays umpire in separation of powers cases where the Court chooses which
majority should govern as between the national majority that elects the President and the very different
national majority that elects the Senate and the House of Representatives over a six-year cycle in races
that go on district by district and state by state. As Professor Willmoore Kendall argues, both of these
“[t]wo [m]ajorities” are national majorities, but they often disagree about what makes for good public
policy.17 When the Supreme Court plays umpire in a separation of powers dispute between the President
and Congress, there is again no countermajoritarian difficulty. Supreme Court adjudication of separation
of powers issues keeps Congress and the President within their assigned and respective spheres of
governance. It thus perfects the Madisonian system of horizontally divided power.

Just as federalism umpiring led to judicial review in the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, the
European Union, and India so too has separation of powers umpiring led to judicial review in France.18
The French Constitutional Council was created solely for the purpose of umpiring between the President
and Parliament, but it has expanded into a full-fledged constitutional court, which also protects individual
human rights.19 Separation of powers umpiring, like federalism umpiring, strengthens judicial review
because it is not countermajoritarian as is individual rights judicial review.

Professor John Hart Ely praises the judicial umpiring of federalism boundary lines in his discussion of the
second holding of M’Culloch v. Maryland in Democracy and Distrust.20 Ely’s theory of judicial review
explicitly calls on the federal courts to police the political process — as the Warren Court rightly did in the
one-person, one-vote cases — to make sure that political insiders are not rigging the game against
outsiders.21 Ely also argues that the courts should protect minorities from majoritarian prejudice.22

Judicial policing of federalism and separation of powers boundary lines is essential under the U.S.
Constitution because that document divides and allocates power vertically and horizontally among
different majorities. Ely calls for deference to majority rule, but the Constitution empowers different
majorities to rule on pay raises for California state employees and to make agreements with Mexico to
control immigration. Policing the American political process to enhance majority rule requires first that one
assess which majority is entitled to rule on an issue, as between a national majority and majorities in the
states.

Judicial umpires are required under Ely’s theory of judicial review because we cannot trust the insiders in
Congress to be the judges of the scope of their own power. No one should be the judge of his own cause,
and putting Congress in charge of the limits on its own power is like asking a fox to guard a hen house.
The federal courts should presume that acts of Congress are constitutional, but if Congress intrudes into
the domain where the Constitution says the states rule or the President rules, the federal courts should
intervene. Judicial enforcement of federalism is as legitimate as judicial enforcement of the one-person,
one-vote rule because both types of enforcement perfect our Madisonian system of constitutionally
divided and allocated powers.

The bottom line is that the reality of American constitutional democracy differs radically from Karlan’s
simplistic account of a democratic Congress squaring off against a life-tenured Supreme Court. The U.S.
Constitution sets up a complex system whereby power is divided both horizontally among the three
branches of the federal government and vertically between the federal government and the states. No
single one of these institutions speaks exclusively for the American people, as Karlan seems to believe.

At the federal level, the Constitution creates three elected institutions: the President, the Senate, and the
House of Representatives, each of which is elected over a rolling six-year cycle in three elections held two
years apart. All three of these institutions in some way speak for and represent a majority of the American
people. In addition, thousands of state officers are also elected at different times over the six-year federal
electoral cycle, and thirty-nine out of fifty states elect their governors only in non-presidential election
years.23 These state elected officials also reflect the popular will. Karlan thus is just plain wrong when she
implies that only the Congress, which was elected along with President Obama, speaks for the people.

The states also speak for the people, as does the majority of the House of Representatives, which was
elected in 2010 and which voted to repeal the health care law in 2011 and again in 2012.

American constitutional democracy differs radically from most parliamentary democracies. For example,
unlike the United Kingdom, Americans sample the popular will three times over six years in differently
sized constituencies. In the United Kingdom, the popular will is sampled only once in each constituency,
often only every four or five years. As a result, our constitutional system is substantially more democratic
than is the U.K. system for much the same reasons that a long-term tracking poll is superior to one poll
taken two weeks before Election Day. Taking multiple samples in multiple constituencies leads to better
information about what the people really want. Enduring popular movements may sweep the six-year
cycle of three biennial elections, as the New Dealers did when they won the elections of 1930, 1932,
1934, and 1936, but most popular movements die out fairly fast — as did the Obama movement, which
crashed and burned in 2010.

Enduring popular movements get, as a prize, the ability to reshape the Supreme Court, because the
Supreme Court does in fact follow the national election returns for Presidents and senators.24 At any
given point in time, the Supreme Court reflects the views held by Presidents and senators ten to fifteen
years earlier. Karlan seems oblivious to the fact that the Supreme Court might itself be a lagging indicator
of what the people used to think as opposed to what they think now. She thus attacks the Court as being
inherently undemocratic when in fact it merely checks and balances passions of the moment in light of
earlier majority preferences.

Karlan’s Foreword also overlooks the fact that most of the text of the Constitution is about the division and
allocation of power either among the three branches of the federal government or between the federal
government and the states. This fact is true of all of Article I, except for Sections 9 and 10; of all of Article
II; of most of Articles III, IV and VI; and of all of Article V. The Bill of Rights itself was a federalism
provision until the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated it against the states, which is why it started by
forbidding Congress from interfering with state established churches and ended with the Tenth
Amendment.

The Constitution literally devotes thousands of words to describing the separation of powers and
federalism but only fifty-two words, in the second sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, to the
protection of individual rights from incursions by the states. Yet Karlan seems to think that the Supreme
Court should spend 95% of its time enforcing the fifty-two words in the second sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment and no time at all enforcing federalism or separation of powers guarantees. This argument is
itself at war with the text of the Constitution, and it is in an important sense unconstitutional.

Karlan criticizes the Roberts Court for its decision in Citizens United v. FEC25 as well as for the health
care case, but even she concedes that Ely had criticized campaign finance laws out of concern that “the
Burger Court was balancing away freedom of speech that the Warren Court had protected more
robustly.”26 The whole complaint about campaign finance laws is that they protect incumbents from wellfinanced challengers. It would thus be hard to imagine a more clear-cut case where Ely’s theory of judicial
review would be applicable than with campaign finance cases.

Karlan also complains for good measure about the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, but that
case also seems like a paradigmatic example of the Supreme Court policing the federal political process.
In Bush v. Gore,27 the Supreme Court stopped a state court lawsuit that was brought by the thenincumbent Vice President, in which Vice President Gore tried to get the state courts to count in his favor
thousands of paper ballots, which state election officials had refused to count.28 For twenty years prior to
Bush v. Gore, law professors led by Ely had called on the Supreme Court to police the political process as
the Court had done in the one-person, one-vote cases. In Bush v. Gore, the legal academy got exactly
what it had been asking for.29

Karlan’s criticisms of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, of Citizens United v. FEC,
and of Bush v. Gore all fall short of the mark. All these decisions are almost compelled by Ely’s theory of
judicial review rather than being foreclosed by it. Moreover, there is no countermajoritarian difficulty when
the Supreme Court plays umpire in a federalism or a separation of powers dispute. The
countermajoritarian difficulty arises only in individual rights cases.

* Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Visiting Professor of Political Science, Brown University;
Joseph R. Weisberger Visiting Professor of Law, Roger Williams University. This article expands on
arguments first made in Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1373 (1998). Special thanks to Gary Lawson for his helpful comments and suggestions and
to Jason Fried for his help as my research assistant. I would like to dedicate this essay to Supreme Court
Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, Jr.
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